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THE PURPOSE OF 
THE CORPORATION
  By Paige Morrow and Jeroen Veldman 
Paige Morrow and Jeroen Veldman report on the 
findings of a major global project to identify how 
companies can create long-term sustainable value.
etween 2014 and 2016 the Purpose of the 
Corporation Project, with the support of 
Cass Business School, held a global series 
of roundtables with more than 260 thought leaders 
to discuss the foundational question: what is 
the purpose of the corporation? The roundtable 
series and research yielded a report, ‘Corporate 
Governance for a Changing World’ which provides 
priorities for corporate governance theory and 
practice to address.
Since the 1970s, corporate governance 
models have been narrowing in order to put the 
maximisation of shareholder value at the centre 
of corporate attention. The resultant focus on the 
share price leads to short-termism, undermines 
a corporations’ ability to invest in its future, and 
diminishes the capacity to anticipate and mitigate 
systemic risks. The trend is particularly acute in 
Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions but it is visible worldwide.
Critically examining the move toward shareholder 
primacy, we found that the definition of corporate 
purpose determines a corporation’s ability to 
recognise, respect, and balance stakeholder needs, 
which is key to its long-term success, as well as its 
ability to operate in line with societal interests, and to 
maintain public trust and its social license to operate. 
Corporate purpose determines a 
company’s ability to recognise, respect, 
and balance stakeholder needs
The experts in the roundtables agreed that 
company law worldwide in principle permits a broad 
perspective on the purpose of the corporation and 
mandates the direction of fiduciary duties toward 
the corporation, not the shareholders. Shareholder 
primacy, therefore, shapes business culture 
and practice but is not required by law in most 
jurisdictions, including the U.K. and the U.S. 
Jeroen Veldman is 
a senior research fellow 
at the Cass Business School, 
City University, London, and 
Paige Morrow is head of Brussels 
operations at law firm Frank Bold 
and the Executive Director of 
the HEC-NYU EU Public 
Interest Law Clinic. 
Defining the purpose of the corporation as the creation of long-
term sustainable value while contributing to societal well-being and 
environmental sustainability, the report contains seven proposals:
Embedding a clear sense of purpose 
Embedding purpose requires careful consideration on how 
to protect the vision and long-term value creation strategy of 
the company in the constitutional documents. Additionally, a 
corporation may, where available, consider using an alternative 
legal form established to protect social purpose, such as the 
Benefit Corporation, or it could consider retaining a traditional 
corporate form and certify as a B corporation. In the long-term, 
it may be appropriate for regulators to consider specifying 
corporate purpose or requiring corporations to publicly disclose 
one, as was required for public corporations earlier in history. 
Clarifying fiduciary duties 
Company directors typically owe their duties to the corporation, 
not to shareholders. The focus on the long-term success of the 
company in turn implies that directors should take into account 
and balance the interests of various stakeholders. Forward-
looking directors may reflect these considerations in corporate 
governance documents, strategic objectives, key performance 
indicators, corporate reports and executive incentive systems. 
Regulators may choose to specify directors’ duties with respect 
to the long-term development of the entity, systemic risk and 
stakeholders. For example, there is currently a debate in the UK 
about revising the principle of ‘enlightened shareholder value’ as 
set out in the Companies Act 2006. 
With respect to the obligations of institutional investors, while 
the term fiduciary duty might not be found in all countries, similar 
concepts regarding duties of loyalty and prudence exist in most 
jurisdictions, and require trustees properly to consider long-
term financial returns and the management of risk. Although 
trustees are legally permitted to take account of ESG factors in 
making investment decisions, the law is vague on the limits of 
this discretion. It is expected that the law will rapidly evolve in 
response to emerging challenges such as climate change. 
Strengthening the role of the board 
While investors have an important role to play in corporate 
governance, board leadership is fundamental to setting a vision for 
the company and creating a strong corporate culture. Proposals for 
strengthening the board include mandating independent directors to 
represent specific types of stakeholders and setting the corporation’s 
mission, as well as committing to the creation of long-term value.
Engaging stakeholders 
Stakeholders such as employees, customers and creditors 
have an interest in the long-term success of the company. A 
corporation’s success depends on obtaining resources provided 
by these stakeholders, who in a broader sense include the natural 
environment, states, and society at large. Corporate governance 
documents should therefore specify which audiences and matters 
are most relevant for the corporation, while directors should 
consider and report appropriately on how those matters are 
reflected in strategy. Corporations should also consider effective 
methods for engaging stakeholders in their governance through 
representation and/or consultation. 
Revising incentive structures 
Much of the widely reported loss of public trust in corporate 
leadership stems from the perception that executive pay is not 
linked to performance or the provision of overall social utility, and 
furthermore contributes to intra-firm and macro-level inequality. 
Responding to the debate about the need to simplify pay 
structures and reduce the variable portion, i.e. stock options, 
the report finds that the variable part of pay may be tied to the 
creation of long-term value while share-based remuneration may 
be subject to the achievement and sustainment of long-term 
goals. Additionally, the introduction of claw-back clauses can give 
additional security where misconduct is later discovered.
Fostering “patient capital.” 
Proposals provided by roundtable participants included the use 
of multiple share classes and allocating rights and incentives to 
investors on the basis of how long they own shares or how much 
they contribute to the corporation’s capital. Short-termism is often 
fuelled by a fear that if the share price is low, the company may 
be vulnerable to takeover or merger bids. A relevant question 
is therefore what mechanisms should be available to boards of 
directors to protect the company against unwanted takeovers.
Improving reporting. 
There are increasing requirements on companies to disclose 
ESG information, such as the EU Non-Financial Reporting 
Directive. The roundtable participants agreed on the need for 
harmonisation of reporting on the risks of adverse social and 
environmental impacts connected to the corporation’s business, 
allowing for the internalisation of broad economic, financial, 
ecological and political risks.
From a corporate governance perspective, the underlying issue 
is how to disclose this information in a way that combines 
meeting the needs of investors for an understanding of the firm’s 
value proposition, complying with legal disclosure requirements, 
and giving an accurate picture of the company to other relevant 
stakeholders. The International Integrated Reporting framework 
provides one possible way forward by suggesting how to 
reconnect reporting to the boards’ consideration of risks and 
their impact on the business model. 
Conclusions
The ‘Corporate Governance for a Changing World’ report 
shows how diverse groups of actors with a concern about 
corporate governance can together develop the means to 
establish a clear sense of corporate purpose, promote the 
rethinking of corporate governance so it aligns with a strong 
socially beneficial corporate purpose, and stimulate the creation 
of new mechanisms for embedding such corporate purpose in 
corporate governance theory and practice. 
The conclusions may help to identify broadly supported policy 
positions that are compatible with sustainable value creation and 
systemic market integrity, assist companies working to develop 
and maintain a focus on longer-term decision-making, and 
aid institutional investors to fulfil their fiduciary duty to provide 
sustainable returns to clients and their beneficiaries over a long-
term horizon.
“Corporate Governance for a Changing World: Report of a Global Roundtable Series” is available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2805497
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